CVE-2025-38413
Medium
Elevated severity or exploit probability.
CVSS breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
| Attack Vector | L | Local |
| Attack Complexity | L | Low |
| Privileges Required | N | None |
| User Interaction | N | None |
| Scope | U | Unchanged |
| Confidentiality | H | High |
| Integrity | N | None |
| Availability | H | High |
Timeline
- 2025-07-25 — Published (NVD)
- 2026-07-30 — Last modified (NVD)
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio-net: xsk: rx: fix the frame's length check When calling buf_to_xdp, the len argument is the frame data's length without virtio header's length (vi->hdr_len). We check that len with xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len to ensure the provided len does not larger than the allocated chunk size. The additional vi->hdr_len is because in virtnet_add_recvbuf_xsk, we use part of XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM for virtio header and ask the vhost to start placing data from hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM - vi->hdr_len not hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM But the first buffer has virtio_header, so the maximum frame's length in the first buffer can only be xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() not xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len like in the current check. This commit adds an additional argument to buf_to_xdp differentiate between the first buffer and other ones to correctly calculate the maximum frame's length.