CVE-2026-6406
Medium
Elevated severity or exploit probability.
CVSS breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
| Attack Vector | L | Local |
| Attack Complexity | L | Low |
| Privileges Required | L | Low |
| User Interaction | N | None |
| Scope | C | Changed |
| Confidentiality | H | High |
| Integrity | H | High |
| Availability | H | High |
Timeline
- 2026-05-22 — Published (NVD)
- 2026-07-23 — Last modified (NVD)
Description
The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop. When ECI is enabled, Docker socket mounts from containers are denied unless explicitly allowed via the admin-settings configuration. However, the --use-api-socket flag adds the Docker socket mount via the HostConfig.Mounts field rather than the HostConfig.Binds field. The ECI enforcement in the Docker Desktop API proxy only inspected Binds, allowing the mount to pass unchecked. This grants a container full access to the Docker Engine socket and, if the host user has logged in to container registries, their authentication credentials. A local attacker with the ability to run Docker CLI commands can exploit this to escape ECI restrictions, access the Docker Engine, and potentially escalate privileges.